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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
2
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
4
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
6
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
- Payment of Money-Additional Consideration.-While it is a general
rule that the payment in money of a less sum than an entire liquidated
debt, though agreed by the creditor to be in full of the debt, is not a
good accord and satisfaction, yet the rule will not be applied where any
other consideration for the creditor's agreement, even though slight, can
be found: Mitchell v. Wheaton, 46 Conn.
A creditor had brought suit upon a liquidated debt of $299, and
while it was pending agreed to accept of the debtor $150 in full of the
debt, the debtor also to pay the costs and expenses of the suit when
ascertained. The debtor paid the $150, and afterwards the amount of
the costs and expenses, which was found to be 818. Held, that this
last payment made a sufficient additional consideration for the creditor's
agreement, and that the transaction was a good accord and satisfac-
tion : Id.
ADVANCEMENT. See Mortgage.
AMENDMENT. See Lien.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
Error in Charge of Court-Failure to state Evidence in Bill. -
Where complaint is made of the charge of the court, the bill must con-
tain a distinct statement of the testimony given or offered which raises
the question to which the charge applied. An omission to do this is
not cured by the fact tnat in the charge the court assumed that the evi-
dence had been given: Worthington v. Mason, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1879.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See Surety.
CONTRACT. See Covenant; Specific Performance.
Variance of Sealed Contract by Parol.-Notwithstanding what was
said in some of the old cases, it is now recognised doctrine that the
terms of a contract under seal may be varied by a subsequent parol
agreement. Certainly whatever may have been the rule at law such is
the rule in equity: Chesapeake & Ohio Cain'l 0o, v. Ray, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1879.
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1879. The cases will probably be reported in 10 or 11 Otto.
2 From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appefir in 46 Conn. Reports.
S From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 90 Ills. Reports.
4 From E. L. Dc Witt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 35 Ohio St. Reports.
6 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 48 Wis. Reports.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
CORPORATION.
Officers-Statute inposing Liability for Debts in case of Reglect of
Duties- Construction of-Liability of Officer not affected by Infor-
mality in Election.-A statute of Connecticut required the president
and secretary of every joint stock company to file with the town clerk
annually, on or before the 15th of February or of August, a certificate
of the affairs of the company, and in case of an intentional neglect of
such officer to perform such duty he was made liable to an action for all
debts of the corporation contracted during the period of such neglect.
In an action against the president for a debt of the corporation, -eld,
that this statute was penal and should be strictly construed. Reid
further, that one elected and serving as president might incur the
statute liability notwithstanding an informality in his election. Held
further, that one elected president in June was under no legal obliga-
tion to file a certificate until the 15th of the following August, although
no certificate had been filed by his predecessor since June of the pre-
vious year, and hence he was not personally liable for merchandise
ordered before his election and delivered after his election, but before
August 15th: Providence Steam Engine Co. v. Hubbard, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1879.
COVENANT.
To Support Grantor in Consideration of Conv.ance-Not Assignable
and does not run with the Land-On Failure of Consideration Equity
will Cancel Deed-Putting Plaintiff on Terms in Equity.-In 1875
plaintiffs, a married couple, old and infirm, conveyed the homestead
farm to their daughter C., on the sole consideration that she should sup-
port and maintain them during the remainder of their natural lives; and
at the same time the daughter executed to her father an instrument, called
in the complaint a " lease of said lands to hold the same during his life-
time" and that of his wife, with a covenant to support them during
their lives in a comfortable manner, and a provision empowering them,
or either of them, upon breach of such covenant, to take possession of
the premises and hold them for their support and maintenance. A few
months afterwards the daughter died; since that time plaintiffs have
supported themselves; all the children and heirs at law of C., except
one, are non-residents of this state, and "do not desire to carry out"
C.'s agreement with plaintiffs, and that one is not of sufficient ability to
do so. Held, that C.'s covenant was not assignable nor binding upon
her heirs ; and equity at plaintiff's suit will cancel the conveyance to
C. : Bishop v. Aldrich, 48 Wis.
It seems, that if, between the date of such conveyance and C.'s death,
she expended for plaintiffs' support more than she received from them,
the court may make her personal representative a party to the action,
ascertain the amount, and require payment thereof as a condition of
relief : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Abduction.-Under the statute making it an offence punishable in the
penitentiary, to entice or take away an unmarried female of a chaste life
and conversation from her parents' house, or wherever she may be found,
for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage, or to assist in such abduc-
tion, it is sufficient to constitute the crime that a girl living with her
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parents is induced, by persuasion or enticements to go to some conve-
venient place from her tther's house, in the immediate neighborhood,
for the purpose of prostitution, where she is gone only an hour or two
at a time, she continuing to dwell with her parents all the time: Slocum
v. !The 1People, 90 Ill.
Conspirary.-In order to sustain a conviction for a conspiracy, the
object of the conspiracy must be proved as laid in the ifidictment, and
there must be more than one person shown to be guilty. It needs some-
thing more than proof of a mere passive cognisance of fraudulent or
illegal action of others to show a conspiracy. There must be something
showing active participation of some kind by the parties charged: Evans
v. The People, 90 Ills.
DAM. See Evidence; Lien.
DAMAGES.
Suit for Personal I1yuries-Mental Sufferin.-On the trial of a suit
for damages for the negligent shooting of plaintiff by defendant, the
court charged the jury that they might take into consideration "a fair
compensation for the physical andmentalsuffering caused by the injury."
ield, that the effect of this instruction -was no more than to allow the
jury to give compensation for the personal suffering caused plaintiff by
the injury and that in this there was no error: .MIntyre v. Giblin, S.
C. U. S., October Term 1879.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife.
DEED.
Construction- General Words following Spec ification of Particulars
-Mortgage of Railroad.-The rule with regard to the effect of general
words following the specification of particular articles in a conveyance,
is, that if the object was to convey a limited interest the general words
do not enlarge that interest, but if a general interest then they operate
to include everything that falls within the general words used. It is
simply applying the general rule that an instrument shall be construed
according to the intention of the parties as gathered from it: Raymond
v. Clark, 46 Conn.
A railroad company, empowered by its charter to issue bonds and
secure them by a mortgage of its property to the treasurer of the state
in trust for the bondholders, with power on the part of the trustee to
take possession of and operate the road in default of payment, made such
a mortgage, describing the property mortgaged as follows: "All and
singular the railways, rails, bridges, station houses, depots, shops, build-
ings, tools, cars, engines, equipments, machinery, fuel, materials, privi-
leges and property, real or personal. belonging or which may hereafter
belong to the grantors, and be used as a part of said railroad or be appur-
tenant thereto or necessary for the construction, operation or security
thereof; and also all the rights and franchises of said company, with the
tolls, income, issues and profits thereof." .ield, that a quantity of office
furniture used in one of the offices of the company was covered by the
mortgage ; Id.
The defendants, with knowledge of the mortgage and of the fact that
the railroad company had made default of payment of interest on its
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bonds, attached the office furniture, removed it, and afterwards sold it
on execution. The trustee, on the property being taken, made demand
for it upon the officer, and afterwards brought an action of trover for it
The defendants denied the right of the trustee to the property, and the
case was tried on its merits, and reserved, on a finding of the ficts for
the advice of this court. Beld, that the court would not entertain the
objection that.the demand for the property should have been made on
the defendants themselves and not on the officer : Id.
EQuiTY. See Covenant.
Jurisdiction- Wager.-Courts of Chancery will assume jurisdiction
to restrain the enforcement of unexecuted contracts founded on wagers
or bets prohibited by law: Petillon v. ipptle, 90 Ills.
EVIDENCE. See Contract.
Dam- Tolls on Logs run through-Secondarj Evidence of Amount
of Logs.-In an action for tolls due upon logs run through plaintiff's
dam, defendants having failed to produce upon due notice, the scale
book of the logs cut at their camp, there was no error in admitting sec-
ondary proof of the contents of such book (by testimony of the person
who kept it), together with evidence that all the logs so scaled were run
through the dam : Tewksbury v. Schulenberg, 48 Wis.
Where defendant's agent, charged with cutting, hauling and getting
out the logs, employed a person to keep another scale book, at the land-
ing, and such book had been delivered to and retained by defendants,
and they had made settlements for stampage in accordance therewith.
Reld, that testimony of their said agent as to its contents was properly
admitted: Id.
Plaintiff was authorized by statute to maintain certain dams, with a
proviso that they should not raise the water above a certain height; was
required to build and maintain suitable slides and flood-gates for specified
purposes, keep them in repair, and also keep them open at certain times;
and when he should have completed "said dams as aforesaid," was to
have power to collect tolls on logs, &c., passing over the slides or driven
by the aid of the dams, as a compensation for maintaining such dams,
with a proviso that he was at all times to comply with the provisions as
to slides and flood-gates. iReld, that upon showing that his dams were
"in good repair," and "fit to run logs through," that the slides and
gates were sufficient, and that defendants could not have run their logs
through without the aid of such dams, he was entitled to recover the
tolls without further proof on his part of compliance with the statute:
-rd.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
Husband and Wife-Action against Common Carrier.-A judgment
in an action of assumpsit brought by a husband and wife on a contract,
by a carrier of passengers to carry the wife safely, for injuries to the
wife while being carried, is a bar to another action of assumpsit on the
same contract by the husband alone, to recover for the same injuries:
Pollard v. N. J. Railroad & Trans. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
A different rule prevails when the action is in tort against the carrier
for a br.ach of his public duty, except, perhaps, in states like New Jer-
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sey, where by statute the husband may in such an action add claims in
his own right to those of his wife: Id.
GUARANTY.
Assignment of.-The plaintiff made a loan of $3000 to P., taking his
note therefor endorsed by A. At the same time P. made his note to A.
for the same sum, payable to A.'s order, with a guaranty "of its payment
by the defendants, this note and guaranty being intended as a security
to A. for his endorsement. The note of P. to the plaintiff not being
paid, and P. being bankrupt, A. endorsed and delivered the note held
by him to the plaintiff and assigned to him the guaranty. Held, in a
suit upon the guaranty, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover:
Stearns v. Bates, 46 Conn.
HIGHWAY.
Defect in-Obstruction-Structure-Turnpike-Abandonment.--The
statute (Gen. Stat. tit. 16, ch. 7, sect. 10), provides that when an injury
on a highway is caused by a structure legally placed upon it by a rail-
road company, the company and not the party bound to keep the road
in repair, shall be liable therefor. Held, that a moving train of cars was
not a structure within the meaning of the statute: Lee v. Town of
Barklhampstead, 46 Conn.
A declaration alleged that E certain highway was defective and un-
safe, and that by reason thereof the horse of the plaintiff ran into and
his carriage was dashed upon a large pile of rocks lying upon the high-
way and contiguous thereto and by means thereof were injured. Held,
to be clearly sufficient after verdict and the court inclined to regard it as
good on demurrer: Id.
The question whether, considering all the circumstances, a town had
done all that could reasonably be required, to make a highway safe, and
whether a pile of rocks by the side of the road was a defect of the high-
way, are questions of fact, the conclusions of the jury upon which can-
not be reviewed by this court: Id.
The highway in question had formerly been a turnpike road. The
turnpike company, four years before the injury, had ceased to repair it
or to take tolls upon it, and the town had immediately after assumed the
control of it and had ever since kept it in repair. The act in force at that
time(Gen. Stat. of 1866, tit. 31, sect. 93), provided that where a turn-
pike company in such manner abandoned its road for one year, it should
constitute an abandonment and forfeiture of its corporate rights and the
road should become a public highway. Held, that no certificate or other
act of the turnpike commissioners was necessary to make the abandon-
ment complete : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Former Adjudication; Joint Debtors.
Doing Business in Wife's Name-_Fraud against Oreditors.-Where
an insolvent husband carries on business in his wife's name, claiming
to be her agent at a salary, unless it is done in good faith and with the
separate means of the wife, derived from some source other than the
husband, the stock in trade and furniture are liable to be sold for his
debts: Robinson v. Brems, 90 Ills.
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INFANT. See Surety.
JOINT DEBTORS.
Husband and Tfe-Judgment against one of Joint Debtors.-Judg-
ment against one of several merely joint debtors is a bar to a subsequent
action against the others, the debt being merged in the judgment: ;auer
v. Bandow, 48 
Wis.
In an action against husband and wife to enforce a mechanic's lien
for the erection of a building on the wife's lot, a personal judgment was
obtained against the husband alone, and a lien adjudged upon the wife's
house and lot. After reversal of the latter part only of the judgment,
the Circuit Court, on affidavits tending to show merely a joint liability
of the wife with the husband, without vacating the personal judgment
against the husband, permitted the complaint to be amended so as to
allege the wife's personal liability and granted a new trial. -Held, error:
Id.
JUDGMENT.
For greater Amount than declared for-A judgment for a sum
greater than the amount due upon the cause of action as stated in the
record is erroneous; and the previous consent of the parties that such
judgment might be rendered does not cure the error: Rosebrough v.
Ansley, 35 Ohio St.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See Pleading.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Liability to pay Rent-Abandonment.-If a tenant retains possession
of leased premises, either actual or constructive, he will be liable for the
rent so long as his possession continues, even though he may have good
cause for abandoning the same before the expiration of the term, for
the acts of the landlord, or omission of duty on his part. Before the
tenant can defend against the payment of rent, he must abandon the
premises. A retention of the keys of a rented building by the tenant
is a constructive possession by him : Burnham v. Martin, 90 Ills.
LIEN.
Assignment of Claim Destroys Lien-Dam-Tolls for Logs Run
through-Amendmrent.-The general rule is that in the absence of any
statutory provision to the contrary, the assignment of a claim for which
the assignor may have by law a specific lien, before action, destroys the
right to the lien, and a reassignment to him does not revive the lien:
Tewksbury v. Bronson, 48 Wis.
An action to enforce a lien given by statute for tolls on logs run
through plaintiff's dam, is an action at law on contract: 17.
In such an action against X. and Y., the complaint alleging that
X. owned the logs, and that Y. had some claim upon or inteiest in
them, demanded a personal judgment against X. for the amount of the
tolls, and that the same be declared a lien upon the logs. It appearing
on the trial that Y. owned the logs, and the action being dismissed as to
X., it was an abuse of discretion to refuse plaintiff permission to amend
the complaint so as to demand a personal judgment against Y. : Id.
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MERGER. See Mortgage.
MORTGAGE. See Deed.
ecurity for Note-Description of Note given for Security as an
Absolute Debt.-A mortgage describing as an absolute indebtedness a
note given as security for a contingent liability assumed by the mort-
gagee, is not good against a bona fide purchaser of the land without
notice: Stearns v. Porter, 46 Conn.
Equity of" Realenption-Execution against-Advancement- Waste
-ferger.-R. mortgaged certain real estate, the equity of redemption in
which was afterwards set off on an execution against him to a creditor,
who conveyed the same to the wife of R. She afterwards died intes-
tate. After her death R. remained in possession, and some time later
was required to pay and did pay the mortgage-debt. Upon a bill for a
foreclosure of the mortgage brought by the executor of R. against his
children, who were also the children and heirs at law of R.'s wife, it
was held, 1. That the payment of the mortgage-debt by R. put him in
the place of the mortgagee. 2. That there was no presumption of law
that the money paid was an advancement to his children, the question
being one of intent. 3. That as the payment was an involuntary one,
and he had made no charge or memorandum of it as an advancement,
but had preserved the note and mortgage among his valuable papers,
the conclusion at which the court below had arrived, that an advance-
ment was not intended, was a reasonable one. 4. That although R.,
after paying the mortgagc-debt, had the rights of a mortgagee, yet as he
had also a life-estate as tenant by the curtesy, he was not chargeable
with the rents and profits during the time that he held the property
after such payment. 5. That as it was not for his interest that the life-
estate should be extinguished, the law would not regard it as extin-
guished. 6. That if R. would have been liable for waste as tenant for
life, yet he would not be so liable as mortgagee: Bart v. Chase, 46
Conn.
NEGLIGENCE. See Damages.
As between Master and Servant.-In an action by a servant against
his employer, to recover damages for a personal injury caused by the
use of defective machinery or materials employed in the business, the
observance of due care and caution on the part of the servant is indis
pensable to his right to recover: Pennsylvania Co. v. Lynch, 90 Ills.
Collision with Team on Highway- Contributory .Negligence matte?
for the Jury.-In an action against a railroad company for injuries
received by plaintiff, from collision with a train, while driving his team
and wagon across defendant's road, the court cannot say, as matter of
law, that ordinary care required plaintiff to stop his team and listen for
the train; or that trotting his team to within a rod of the track was
negligence, even though he knew that the train usually passed the
crossing at about that time in the day: but these questions are for the
jury : Eilert v. G. B. & Minn. Railroad Co., 48 Wis.
Evidence that, by reason of excavations, the formation of the land in the
vicinity, and the presence of timber near the crossing, it was somewhat
difficult for persons near it on the highway to see an approaching train,
would support a finding by the jury that a failure to signal the approach
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of the train (by bell or whistle) was negligence, although such signals
were not then required by statute : Id.
Such a finding may be supported by mere negative testimony, not-
withstanding positive testimony on defendant's part that signals were
given : Id.
PLEADING. See Judgment.
In Justice's Court-Action for Loan of Chattels.-Complaint in ju-
tice's court, "that defendants are indebted," to plaintiff "in manner fol-
lowing: For a stove lent. to defendants * * of the value, &c., * * *
which defendants have never returned to plaintiff, and refused to return
when demanded." feld, an action ex contractu; and on proof (upon
appeal to the Circuit Court) that the stove belonged to plaintiff and
another person, as copartuers, a nonsuit should have been granted: Slutts
v. Chaffee et al., 48 Wis.
RAILROAD. See Deed; .Negligence.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Conclusiveness of Proceedings before Removal.-The transfer of a suit
from a state court to a Circuit Court does not vacate what had been
done in the state court previous to removal: Duncan v. Gegan, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
SALE.
Conditional Sale of Standing Timber.-By the terms of a written
instrument, defendant sold T. & Co. all the merchantable pine standing
on certain lands; T. & Co. were to place a certain mark on the end of
each piece of timber cut, and to cause the timber to be manufactured
into lumber and shingles, but were not to sell or otherwise dispose of any
timber, or -lumber manufactured therefrom, until the purchase-money
should be paid; the rights of property in and possession of the timber
and lumber were to remain in defendant until such payment: and he
had full power to take possession and sell, on notice, fiel, that the
contract was either a conditional sale of personal property by defendant,
or a chattel-mortgage to him, taking effect as the timber was cut; and
in either case the filing of the instrument in the proper clerk's office,
without recording it in the registry of deeds, was sufficient (under. ch.
113 of 1873, or Tay. Stats. 769, sect. 3), to protect defendant's rights
against a subsequent purchaser from T. & Co. : It.
Damages for non-delivery of Goods.-In order that the buyer may
recover damages for the non-delivery of goods, it is incumbent on him
to prove that he was ready and willing to receive and pay for them as
delivered ; and he is not relieved of this duty by the fact that the mak-
ing of the contract sued on is denied: Simmons v. Green, 35 Ohio
St.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Time as of the Essence of Contract.-The petitioner and respondent,
in October 1875, entered into a written contract by which the latter was
to convey to the former a piece of land, with the wood standing thereon,
an or before February 1st 1876, and the latter was to pay $700 at or
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before the time of the delivery of the deed, with a right to cut the wood
at any time, but not to carry it off until the money was paid. The peti-
tioner failed to pay the money on or before February 1st 1876, but after-
wards made payments from time to time, which the respondent received
without objection, until February 1877, when there was only $10 re-
maining due. This sum the petitioner tendered to the respondent, but
he refused to accept it. Held, on a bill for a specific perfbrmance-1.
That time was not of the essence of the contract. 2. That if it was the
respondent had waived it: Lounsbury v. Beebe, 46 Conn.
STATUTE.
Constructon-Resort to Repealed Statute.-Where a statute still in
force refers to one since repealed, the latter may be resorted to for the
purpose of construing the former; as ex gr. notwithstanding the repeal
of sect. 1210 a., Rev. Stat. 1878, the words of sect. 1210 b., "any of
the causes mentioned in sect. 1210 a.," &c., are to be understood as if
the enumeration of causes thus referred to were incorporated in sect.
1210 b. : Flanders v. Town of Merrimack, 48 Wis.
SURETY.
I.nfant-Chatte-Mortgage to Indemnfy.-A surety upon an infant's
notes for purchase-money of chattels, who has paid a judgment upon
the notes, aad received from the infant a note for the amount so paid,
recured by mortgage of the same chattels, is entitled to hold the pro-
perty as against a subsequent purchaser from the infant with knowledge
of the mortgage : Knaggs v. Green, 48 Wis.
TENANT FOR Luz. See Mortgage.
USURY.
Agreement to pay anything beyond the Legal Interest.-Where money
is loaned at the highest rate of interest allowed by law, a contract to
pay a sum in addition to such rate in consideration of an extension of
the time of payment is usurious: Rosebrough v. Ansley, 35 Ohio St.
WASTE. See Mortgage.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
Injury to Adjacent Owner.-Where a railway company turns its waste
water from a tank, upon the premises of another, where it spreads and
freezes, doing damage to the property of the owner, the company cannot
claim exemption from liability on the gronnd that the freezing of the
water was an act of nature, as such a result from its wrongful act might
have been foreseen. To excuse from liability for an act of nature in
combination with the defendant's own act, it must be such as could not
have been foreseen and prevented by the exercise of ordinary care and
prudence: C. & N. W. Railway Co. v. Hoag, 90 Ills.
